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RETROACTIVITY, EQUAL PROTECTION AND
STANDING
Judge Leon D. Lazer:
Thank you very much, Professor Gora. Our next speaker is
Leon Friedman, who has been with us at all of our conferences.
He is a Professor of Law at Hofstra University, has an extensive
Civil Liberties Union background and is a lecturer at the Federal
Judicial Center on civil rights. Professor Friedman is going to
deal with a number of cases that do not fit easily within the
various Bill of Rights niches, but which we believe, and he
believes, are of significance and of interest. Professor Friedman.
ProfessorLeon Friedman:
I do not know whether to call myself a utility infielder or a
garbage man, but I have a number of widely disparate cases to
talk about, all of which affect state and local governments in a
very significant way.
I want to start with Harper v. Virginia Department of
Taxation,1 the retroactivity case, because this one produced an
interesting split between the so-called conservative judges. 2 I do
not know if there are Federalists out there, but two basic
propositions of Federalist doctrine were at issue here. One was
the extent of state immunity from federal taxation, and the other
was the whole question of retroactivity. To a Federalist, it is very
important that state governments not be imposed upon by federal
courts and federal tax problems. On the other hand, they like to
think of courts as always discovering the law, not making the
law. If you were a possible candidate for a federal judgeship and
you went to the Justice Department in the Reagan and Bush
Administration, the very first question they would ask you is,
"are you in favor of judges making law or do you think judges
1. 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993).
2. Id. at 2513, 2526. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court

and was joined by Justice Scalia, while Justice O'Connor wrote a dissenting
opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined.
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simply discover law?" You had better get that question right or
you are not going to go any further. And, of course, the doctrine
is that judges never make law, they discover law.
Problems of retroactivity implicate that very key issue. Under
what circumstances should a court, having made either a
constitutional or a non-constitutional determination, say that a
law applies in this case and in future cases, but it does not apply
backwards. Any governmental body that says, "This is the law
from now on," is making law. I do not know how else to
describe it. Judges are not supposed to do that, they are supposed
to say, "Oh, we were blind, but now we can see. We did not
know what the law was. Now we know. It is the law and oh, by
the way, it always was the law." If there is one strong Federalist
doctrine, it is that judges should not make law and therefore a
decision should always apply retroactively. The Harper case
involved that issue in a very significant way for state and local
governments.
The Supreme Court recently dealt with the issue of local and
state taxation of governmental retirees. 3 Some states said that
state employees who retired and got certain benefits, such as
pension benefits or retirement pay, would not be taxed by the
state or local government. However, that immunity from taxation
did not apply to federal retirees. Four or five years ago, in a case
called Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury,4 the Supreme
Court held that the state immunity provision that protects state
government retirees, but not federal government retirees, from
state taxation violates a provision of federal law and the doctrine
of intergovernmental tax immunity. 5 Title IV, section 111 says
that it is permissible for local government bodies to tax federal
governmental employees as long as it is not discriminatory, 6 and
3. See infra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
4. 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
5. Id. at 817.

6. 4 U.S.C. § 111 (1966). In relevant part, the section provides:
The United States consents to the taxation of pay or compensation for
personal service as an officer or employee of the United States... by a
duly constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation does

1994]

RETROACTIVIY, EQUAL PROTECTIONAND
STANDI"NG

505

as long as they are treated the same way as everybody else. The

Supreme Court held that to allow pension or retirement benefits
of federal employees to be taxed, but not those of state
7
employees, violates that section.

The question now arises, is that ruling retroactive? Twentythree states had such a rule. 8 It was a fairly well established rule.
Virginia, 9 Michigan, 10 and several other states had them. Now,

what do you do? Needless to say, a group of federal retirees
came into federal court claiming that they paid a discriminatory
tax to the state government, and they wanted those taxes back.
The burden on state and local governments would be very severe
if the taxes had to be repaid. Indeed, Justice O'Connor, in her

dissent in Harper, starts out by saying: "Today the Court applies
a new rule of retroactivity to impose crushing and unnecessary
liability on the states, precisely at a time when they can least
afford it." 11 That is a dissent because in an opinion written by
Justice Thomas, concurred in by Justice Scalia, the United States

not discriminate against the officer or employee because of the source of
the pay or compensation.
Id.
7. Davis, 489 U.S. at 817.
8. See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2515 n.5
(1993) (noting that at the time Davis was decided 23 states had laws that gave
"preferential tax treatment to benefits received by employees of state and local
governments relative to the tax treatment of benefits received by federal
employees").
9. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-322(C)(3) (Michie 1991) (repealed 1989).
The statute exempted from taxation the pensions or retirement income of
officers or employees of the state, its subdivision or agencies, as well as
income paid by the state, its subdivision or agencies, to surviving spouses of
officers or employees. Id.
10. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 206.30(1)(f)(i)-(ii) (West Supp.
1993). The Michigan statute exempts retirement benefits received from the
state, or any of its subdivisions, from taxation, while taxing other forms of
retirement benefits. Id.
11. Harper, 113 S. Ct. at 2526 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court basically said it is fine to impose this unnecessary

12
and crushing liability on the states.
Why did they do that? By the way, Justice Rehnquist joined
Justice O'Connor's dissent, so we have the four conservative
justices absolutely split down the middle. 13 In addition, there was
some very angry finger-pointing by Justice Scalia at Justice
O'Connor, 14 and Justice O'Connor at Justice Scalia, 15 about the

whole question of retroactivity. Justice Scalia said, as between
crushing taxation on the states and conservative intellectual
16
purity, intellectual purity will win in every instance.
Well, it certainly wins in this instance. Justice Scalia, in a very
strong opinion, said that every prior decision under which a court
applied a rule prospective in nature was wrong, and goes against
12. Id. at 2519-20. If a state is found to have levied an "'impermissibly
discriminatory tax,'" the Constitution requires the state "'to provide relief
consistent with Federal Due Process principles.'" Id. at 2519 (quoting
American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 181 (1990)). The
Court, however, did hold that "federal law does not necessarily entitle
[petitioners] to a refund." Id. Rather, the Court held that "a State may either
award full refunds to those burdened by an unlawful tax or issue some other
order that 'create[s] in hindsight a nondiscriminatory scheme.'" Id. at 2520
(quoting McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496
U.S. 18, 40 (1990)).
13. See supra note 2.
14. Harper, 113 S. Ct. at 2523-24 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia,
in response to Justice O'Connor's assertion that "'when the Court changes its
mind, the law changes with it,'" stated that "[tihat concept is quite foreign to
the American legal and constitutional tradition. It would have struck John
Marshall as an extraordinary assertion of raw power." Id. at 2523, 2527
(Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111
S. Ct. 2439, 2451 (1991)). He thus concluded by saying "I join the opinion of
the Court because the doctrine of prospective decision making is not in fact
protected by our flexible rule of stare decisis; and because no friend of stare
decisis would want it to be." Id. at 2524 (Scalia, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 2528 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated that
"Justice Scalia would cast overboard our entire retroactivity doctrine ...[and]
[b]ehind the undisguised hostility to an era whose jurisprudence he finds
distasteful, Justice Scalia raises but two substantive arguments... neither of
which has been adopted by a majority of this Court." Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
16. Id. at 2520-24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the very nature of what the judicial process is all about. 17 The
prior doctrine, at least in the civil field, was the Chevron Oil
doctrine, 18 which implicated all kinds of equitable doctrines. The

Chevron Oil doctrine stated that a court will not apply a new rule
in the civil area, as far as civil law is concerned, if various

equitable considerations are not met.19 Those principles no
longer apply.
There are a whole set of comparable principles in the criminal
law area, and there is a certain amount of tension and
inconsistency in this whole area because Justice Scalia was very
much in favor of not applying new rules in the criminal law area,
17. Id. at 2522 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated that "[t]he
true traditionalview is that prospective decision making is quite incompatible
with the judicial power, and that courts have no authority to engage in the
practice." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
18. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). The respondent in
Chevron Oil suffered a back injury while working on a drilling rig on the
Outer Continental Shelf off the Gulf Coast of Louisiana that was owned and
operated by the Chevron Oil Company. Id. at 98. The respondent did not
discover the injury until many months later, at which time he brought suit for
damages against Chevron Oil. Id. The issues before the Supreme Court were
whether the action was time barred, whether state or federal law was
appropriate in determining whether the action was time barred, and whether a
determination in favor of federal law would be applied retroactively. Id.
19. Id. at 106-07. The Court in Chevron Oil set forth three factors to
consider in dealing with a nonretroactivity question. Id. at 106. First, the
decision in question must "establish a new principle of law, either by
overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied.., or by
deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly
foreshadowed." Id. Next, the court weighs the pro's and con's of each case by
looking at the history, purpose, and effect of the possible retroactive law and
deciding whether such an application will further or impede its application. Id.
at 107. Finally, the court weighs the inequity that would result by a retroactive
application. Where a great inequitable result would occur if the rule was
applied retroactively, the court will hold for nonretroactivity. Id. Based on the
factors it set forth, the Court decided not to retroactively apply the statute of
limitations that was at issue. Id. In the time since the respondent had first
instituted the suit, the Court felt that "[i]t cannot be assumed that he did or
could foresee that this consistent interpretation of the [rule in question] would
be overturned. The most [respondent] could do was to rely on the law as it
then was. - Id.
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as held in Teague v. Lane.20 In Teague, the Court held that you
do not apply a new law in a habeas corpus petition, 2 1 which, by
the way, is a civil suit, as we all know, not criminal. But this

doctrine of retroactivity and prospective application of law is not
as simple as it sounds because the Supreme Court, in the criminal
law area, said "Yes," as long as something is on direct appeal,

any new rule should apply. 22 However, once it is over and we
23
are in the post-conviction area, we will not apply any new rule.
By the way, that is a major issue in the pending crime bill. As

many of you know, the habeas corpus provisions of the pending
crime bill are an extremely contentious part of what is now
before Congress. 24 The whole issue of retroactivity is not a dry
or unimportant academic, philosophical question.
The Harpercase involves hundreds of millions of dollars of tax

payments which are going to have to be repaid, 25 subject only to
the statute of limitations. The one cut back on it is at the very end

of Justice Thomas' opinion, where he said it is not necessary that

20. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
21. Id. at 310. The Court held that "new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before
the new rules are announced." Id. The Court chose to adopt Justice Harlan's
view of retroactivity for those cases which are on collateral review. It stated
that "it is 'sounder, in adjudicating habeas petitions, generally to apply the law
prevailing at the time a conviction became final than it is to seek to dispose of
[habeas] cases on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional
interpretation.'" Id. at 306 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
689 (1971)).
22. Id. at 322. The Court stated that a holding "cannot be applied
retroactively to permit collateral review of convictions that became final before
it was decided. .... " Id.
23. See supra note 21.
24. See Mary Dixon, Court's 'Last Resort' Must Remain Intact Against
Efficiency, CHI. TRM., Jan. 4, 1994, at 15 (stating that proponents of the
crime bill blame congested court systems as a reason to curtail habeas corpus
appeals while opponents feel that a "last-ditch" appeal should be allowed
because a death sentence is "irreversible").
25. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 2519 (1993)
(stating that Davis applies retroactively to the tax years at issue in the refund
action).
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a judgment of a specific amount be laid down by the Court. 26 We
will give the states a certain amount of leeway on how to make
these payments. 27 The states are going to have to pay that money
back, but we will give them a certain amount of time and
flexibility in how they pay it back. 2 8 However, if the states do
not, these plaintiffs can come right back to federal court and get a
judgment for the amount required. So there is a certain amount of
time and flexibility that they are going to give to the states. I do

not know if they will give the tax payers tax credits, or what the
suggestion would be, but it may very well be that they will not be
able to obtain a judgment against the state for a specific amount,
which, of course, involves some Eleventh Amendment
problems. 2 9 At any rate, there is certainly a little bit of flexibility
that they are willing to give the states in making that payment. As
I said, the decision was quite interesting because the three liberal

Justices just sat back and enjoyed the dog fight between the more
conservative justices, who were fighting in favor of state
federalism and immunity on the one hand, and retroactivity on
the other hand.
The second important case that I wanted to mention is Heller v.
Doe by Doe,3 0 an involuntary commitment case dealing with the

difference between the treatment in Kentucky of mentally
3 1 It turns out that
retarded patients and mentally ill patients.

26. Id. at 2519-20 (stating that a state may give full refunds to those
affected by an unlawful tax or they may issue another order to "'createD in
hindsight a nondiscriminatory scheme ").

27. Id. at 2520. ("Virginia 'is free to choose which form of relief it will
provide, so long as that relief satisfies the minimum federal requirements we
have outlined.... .'" (quoting McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic

Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 51-52 (1990))).
28. Id.
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment states that
"[tihe Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." Id.
30. 113 S.Ct. 2637 (1993).
31. Id. at 2640.
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Kentucky law would impose a lower standard for the involuntary
commitment of a mentally retarded patient than it would for a
mentally ill patient. 32 In order to involuntarily commit a mentally
33
retarded patient, there were four standards that had to be met,
but they had to be met by clear and convincing evidence. 34 In
order to involuntarily commit a mentally ill person, you had to
show proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 35 Now, the state is
sending people away and they are losing their freedom, but is
there a basis for treating mentally retarded and mentally ill
patients differently in terms of the standard of proof?. Secondly,
with the mentally retarded patients, the parents could intervene
and be heard. 3 6 The Kentucky law allowed the parents to
37
intervene as a party in the proceedings.

32. See KY.

REv. STAT.

ANN.

§ 202B.160(2) and § 202A.076(2)

(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991). The burden of proof for involuntarily
committing a mentally retarded person is clear and convincing evidence, while
the standard for involuntarily committing a mentally ill person is beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
33. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2641. The four requirements under § 202B.040
are:
(1) The person is a mentally retarded person; (2) The person presents a
danger or a threat of danger to self, family, or others; (3) The least
restrictive alternative mode of treatment presently available requires
placement in [a residential treatment center]; and (4) Treatment that can
reasonably benefit the person is available in [a residential treatment
center].
Id.
34. See supra note 32. The reason asserted by Kentucky for the lower
standard of proof in hearings for the mentally retarded was that mental
retardation is "easier to diagnose than mental illness." Heller, 113 S.Ct. at
2644. The Court found that "Kentucky's basic premise that mental retardation
is easier to diagnos[e] than mental illness has a sufficient basis in fact." Id.
(citations omitted).
35. See supra note 32.
36. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B. 160(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1991). The statute provides:
Guardians and immediate family members of the respondent shall be
allowed to attend all hearings, conferences or similar proceedings; may
be represented by private counsel, if desired; may participate in the
hearings or conferences as if a party to the proceedings; may crossexamine witnesses if desired; and shall have standing to appeal any
adverse decision.
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The lower federal courts held that both provisions were
unconstitutional. 3 8 They said that it is irrational to have a
different standard for mentally retarded and mentally ill
patients. 3 9 They are both in the same boat, so why have a
different standard of proof? They also found that it was a
violation of procedural due process to allow the parents to
intervene as parties because their interest was to get rid of their
child. 4o The implication was that if there was a proceeding to
commit a mentally retarded patient, it was in the parents' interest
to get rid of them and therefore, the whole case would be stacked

against the patient. To have them present in the case would
41
somehow implicate the rights of the mentally retarded person.
In another very close case, the Supreme Court reversed in a
five to four decision, 42 with Justice O'Connor concurring in part
and dissenting in part, and with Justices Souter, Blackmun and

Stevens dissenting. 43 I think the case is quite important because
Id.
37. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2641.
38. See, e.g., Doe v. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Ky. 1991)
(recounting the long and complicated procedural history of the case), aff'd in
part, rev'd inpart, 965 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1992).
39. Id. at 358. The lower court, relying on Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386,
1394 (6th Cir. 1988), held that "mentally retarded persons be afforded the
same protections as are mentally ill persons when facing involuntary
commitment." Id. The court continued by stating that "mere identification of
differences is not enough; equal protection 'require[s] that a distinction made
have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.'" Id.
(quoting Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966)).
40. Id. The court held those sections of the statute which permitted
"parents or guardians... to participate in all aspects of the proceedings"
unconstitutional under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
because it would be unfair to allow third parties to participate when their
interests may be adverse to the mentally retarded person's. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2640 Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion
of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and
Thomas joined.
43. Id. at 2650 (Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Blaclanun,
Stevens, J.J., joined, with O'Connor, J., joining in part. O'Connor, J. also

concurred in part).
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of the extraordinary deference that the Supreme Court gives to
the rational relationship test. 44 Under the Equal Protection
Clause, if you are not in the heightened scrutiny area, you apply
the rational relationship test. The question is, is the rational
relationship test a toothless one? Well, I always used to call it the

"one tooth test." It is not toothless, but there is not a lot of bite
in the whole thing. I think they have shaved off that tooth quite a
bit, because Justice Kennedy basically stated that if you are
applying the rational relationship test, the state or local
45
government does not have to articulate any reason.
Furthermore, if there is any conceivable reason that could have
46
occurred to a rational legislature, we will uphold the law. So
invent something after the fact, and if it is rational, we will
uphold it.

I remember some years ago there was a case called Maher v.
Roe, 47 dealing with the funding of abortions. And I remember
that a friend of Professor Gora's and I got up there and said,
"This law is irrational," and Justice Rehnquist looked at
Professor Gora's friend and said, "Does that mean every
44. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14.3 (4th ed. 1991). Under the rational relationship test, a court will only
invalidate a law if the law has no rational relationship to any legitimate
governmental interest. Id. at 580.
45. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2643 (stating that a state has no duty to explain or
support the "rationality of a statutory classification" and that "'a legislative
choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data'").
46. Id. at 2642. Justice Kennedy stated that "a legislature that creates these
categories need not 'actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale
supporting its classification'

. .

. [iinstead, a classification 'must be upheld

against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state
of facts that could provide a rational basis for classification.'" Id. (citations
omitted).
47. 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause does
not require a state which is participating in Medicaid to pay expenses relating
to nontherapeutic abortions of indigent women because it chose to pay
expenses incident to childbirth); see also Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977)
(holding that there was no equal protection violation by the city of St. Louis in
electing to provide publicly financed hospital service for childbirth but not for
nontherapeutic abortions).
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legislator who voted for it was certifiably insane? Is that what the
test means?" Well, that is about what it means now. You have to
have a certifiably insane legislature in order for the law to be
found irrational.
But, the deference to be given to the legislature is
extraordinary. The state has no obligation to produce evidence to

sustain the rationality of the statutory classification, and a statute
is presumed constitutional. 48 It does not have to be based on any
kind of scientific evidence. This case represents the most
extraordinary deference I have ever seen under the rational
relationship test. I have never seen a case which talked about the
lean-over-backwards test, but that is what they did here. They
leaned over backwards until they practically fell on their backs in
order to sustain the law, and once again, the Court went out of its
way to find some justification to support it. So I think Heller is
important not so much for the specifics of the case, but because it
indicates the extraordinary deference that the federal courts must
now give under the rational relationship test to any kind of state
and local legislation.
The third case I want to talk about is a standing case,
Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General
Contractors of America v. Jacksonville.4 9 It was an attack on a
minority set-aside program instituted in Dade County,
Jacksonville, Florida. 50 The City of Jacksonville had established
a ten percent minority business enterprise requirement. 5 1 An
48. See Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2643 (stating that there "is no obligation to
produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification" and that
[a] statute is presumed constitutional and '[t]he burden is on the one attacking
the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might
support it'" (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S.
356, 364 (1973))).
49. 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993).
50. Id. at 2299.
51. Id. The City of Jacksonville enacted an ordinance which mandated
"that 10% of the amount spent on city contracts be set aside each fiscal year
for so-called 'Minority Business Enterprises.'" Id. A Minority Business
Enterprise was "defined as a business whose ownership was at least 51%
'minority.'" Id. A minority was defined as "a person who is or considers
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association of Florida contractors went into court to challenge the
law, and when the case got to the Supreme Court, the question
was, what kind of injury did this trade association have to show

in order to have standing to challenge the law? 52 In addition,
there was a whole sideshow going on, because while the lawsuit
was pending, Jacksonville repealed the law, or at least amended
it and omitted the ten percent set-aside. Instead, they said that
53
they would now have "participation goals."
Moreover, rather than protect any minority group, the new law
was limited to only racial minorities and women. If you
remember City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,54 a part of the
problem in that case was that the definition of a minority group
included Aleuts and Eskimos 5 5 who had never been discriminated

against as contractors in Richmond, Virginia. Justice O'Connor,
I think, asked why we should give Aleuts and Eskimos this
special position in Richmond, Virginia, when there was no
showing that they had ever been discriminated against in the
56

past.
While the suit was pending, Jacksonville did two things. First,

they redefined minority business enterprises to only include racial

himself to be black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, or
handicapped." Id.
52. Id. at 2301-02.
53. Id. at 2300. Jacksonville repealed the original ordinance and replaced
it with a new ordinance that applied only to blacks and females, which
established 5 to 16% "'participation goals'" rather than a 10% "'set aside,'"
and provided five different methods to achieve the "'participation goals.'" Id.
54. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
55. Id. at 478. In Croson, the Minority Business Utilization Plan adopted
by the Richmond City Council defined minorities as "'[c]itizens of the United
States who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or
Aleuts.'" Id. (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 506. In the Court's opinion, delivered by Justice O'Connor, the
Court stated that "[t]here is absolutely no evidence of past discrimination
against Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons in any
aspect of the Richmond construction industry .... [I]t may well be that
Richmond has never had an Aleut or Eskimo citizen." Id. (emphasis in
original).
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minorities and women, 57 forgetting about the Aleuts and the
Eskimos, as well as anybody else. Second, they stated that it is
no longer a ten percent set-aside, it is only a goal. 58 At that
point, one would think that the Supreme Court would say,
"Okay, the case is now moot, we are not attacking that law
anymore." Indeed, the two dissenters in that case said, "We
should just dismiss this case as moot, it is no longer an issue. "59
I think the case is very important to governmental entities, who
are asking, "If we fixed it all up, why should we still be dragged
into court with respect to a law that is no longer on the books?"
The Supreme Court has not been very clear about when you can
fix a law by repealing that law. If you pass a bad law and
suddenly find yourself in federal court being attacked on it, why
can you not go back and say, "Okay, we want to fix it up. We
are sorry. We will straighten it all out." The Supreme Court
says, "Too late." The Court does not want local governments
changing their minds, mooting a case out, and then changing the
law back again. It is sort of a yo-yo effect. Every time you go
into court, you change the law, the case gets dismissed, then you
change it back and upwards and onwards. So to that extent, the
Supreme Court set a barrier to the ability of local governments to
fix up their laws. You may still be stuck, at least to some extent,
in this law that you passed. You have a federal court case,
attorneys' fees, and a lot of other things to worry about down the
line, but the Court rejected the mootness argument, even though
the particular law that had been in effect, and that started the
lawsuit, was no longer in effect.
But on the merits of the standing issue, the Supreme Court said
that the trade association can bring this action even though it

57. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractorsof Am.,
113 S. Ct. at 2300.
58. Id.

59. Id. at 2305 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that since "this case
more closely resembles those cases in which we have found mootness... I
would not reach the standing question decided by the majority "). Justice
Blackmun joined Justice O'Connor in her dissent. Id.
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cannot show that any member would have lost business. 60 The
general requirement for standing is that you first have to show an
"injury in fact," which is an "invasion of a legally protected
interest,"61 second, "a causal relationship between the injury and
the challenged conduct," 62 and third, "a likelihood that the injury
would be redressed by a favorable decision." 63 In this case, the
trade association could not show, and did not show, that its
members lost business and that they would get business if this
law was not in effect. 64 But what the Supreme Court said was,
"That is not the rule. The rule here is that you have standing if
you cannot compete on an even basis. "65 That is the proposition,
and the Court's exact words were:
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more
difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is
for members of the other group, a member of the former group
seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he or she
would have obtained the benefit but for the barrier [in order to
66
establish standing].

It is the ability to compete on an even playing field that creates
standing. So, the case is expansive as far as state and local
governments are concerned. It undercuts the mootness argument
that if the law gets changed, the case is not moot. Also, to the
extent that if government gives a benefit to one group rather than
another, a person does not have to show that but for this law, we
would have obtained the benefit. All they have to show is that the
government established an unequal playing field. That gives
someone who is on the unequal playing field a chance to come in

60. Id. at 2303. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
61. Id. at 2302.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2299-2300.
65. Id. at 2303. The Court stated that all that was needed for a party to
have standing to challenge a set-aside program is that "it is able and ready to
bid on contracts and that a discriminatory policy prevents it from doing so on
an equal basis." Id.
66. Id.
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and sue in federal court. So, I think the case does have at least

some procedural advantages and implications.
I want to say a word about the Daubert67 case, which is quite
far afield. Daubert is a case dealing with the standard for
admitting scientific and expert testimony under the Federal Rules
of Evidence. The extent to which expert testimony will be ruled
admissible in federal court under Federal Rules of Evidence
702,68 affects everybody, not just state and local governments.
Basically, the Supreme Court stated that the Frye69 case, a
District of Columbia case dating from 1923, had held that

scientific evidence is not admissible, even through an expert's
testimony, unless, "the deduction [] made [is] sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs." 70 If there is a debate in the scientific

community about a particular scientific theory, under the Frye
test, it had to be generally accepted in the scientific field in order
71
to be admissible directly and through expert testimony.
There is a clash between the Frye proposition and Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which says, "[i]f scientific,

technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
67. Daubert v. Merril Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993).
68. FED R. EvID. 702. Rule 702 states that "[i]f scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
69. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
70. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793 (quoting Frye, 293 F. at 1014).
71. The court in Frye stated that:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.
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fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion." 72 The question is, which controls? Did Rule 702
overrule Frye? The answer is "Yes."73
Having gone up the mountain, they came right back down
again, because Rule 702 requires that a federal court act as a
gatekeeper to make sure that there is a predicate for a particular
kind of evidence. 74 Among the gatekeeping criteria a federal
judge can apply before he allows expert testimony to be
introduced is the general acceptability of that scientific
proposition in the community. 75 So, having torn Frye down as an
absolute barrier to admissibility, they then give it some life
through the back door by saying that the federal judge can take
the extent of acceptability in the scientific community as a criteria
for determining admissibility under other rules.
I do want to set aside some time to talk about land use.
Although there were no significant land use cases decided in the
Supreme Court this past year, there were some significant cases
decided in the Second Circuit. I think the most significant case
was Southview Associates Limited v. Bongartz,76 a case decided a
year ago. There are a number of different streams of doctrine
under which a developer, or someone who asked for a permit, or
someone who is requesting a zoning variance and does not get it,
72. FED. R. EviD. 702.

73. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793 ("[It is] contend[ed] that the Frye test was
superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We agree.").
74. See supra note 68; see also Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2800 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) ("I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some
gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions of the admissibility of
proffered expert testimony.").
75. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2800. The Court stated that "reliability and

relevancy are the touchstones of the admissibility of expert testimony." Id.
Therefore, the general acceptability of the scientific proposition would aid in
showing that the "'evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific
validity. '"Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
76. 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom., Southview
Assocs., Ltd. v. Individual Members of Vt. Env't Bd., 113 S. Ct. 1586

(1993).
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can now come into federal court. There are probably at least five

separate legal doctrines- which have been recognized in the
Second Circuit, and elsewhere, for intervention in federal court.
The first one is a "taking." A governmental land use body will
not let me do what I want with my land, and therefore has taken
my land. Sure enough, the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, says that
"private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just
compensation." 7 7 There are two kinds of takings. There is a
physical taking, where the government physically invades the
land and takes it.78 The second kind of taking is a regulatory

taking, where government does not physically come and take the
land, but makes it impossible for you to use the land for the
economic use for which you bought it or tried to develop it.79 So

that is a taking, a taking with two subcategories.
The federal courts, and this is outlined in the Southview case,

have also developed a substantive due process argument. There
77. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
78. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 44, § 11.12, at 435-36.
79. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank
of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 197 (1985) ("'[R]egulation that goes so far that
it has the same effect as a taking by eminent domain is an invalid exercise of
the police power, violative of the Due Process Clause.'"); see also First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 329 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted:
[A] regulatory program that adversely affects property values does
not constitute a taking unless it destroys a major portion of the
property's value. This diminution of value inquiry is unique to
regulatory takings. Unlike physical invasions, which are relatively
rare and easily identifiable without making any economic analysis,
regulatory programs constantly affect property values in countless
ways, and only the most extreme regulations can constitute takings.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 414-15 (1922) (holding that a state could not destroy a coal company's
mining rights without providing just compensation because "while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking"). But see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y., 438 U.S.
104, 138 (1977) (holding that a taking had not occurred where the regulations
imposed were "substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare").
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are two kinds of substantive due process. There is substantive
due process "gone too far." 80 By this we mean, government, you
have gone too far in making this regulation, in prohibiting me
from doing what I want with this land, or by denying me a
permit or whatever.
The other possibility is a substantive due process claim based

on "arbitrary and capricious" governmental conduct. 8 1 Now,
what is the difference between a substantive due process "gone
too far" claim, and one based on "arbitrary and capricious"
conduct? Well, the Second Circuit really does not tell us, except
to state that "gone too far" seems to be too broad. The language
"gone too far" means that it is much broader than is necessary.
"Arbitrary and capricious" means certifiably insane if you make
this decision, or something like that. It is a much narrower
decision, but it does not make a lot of sense.
80. Southview Assocs., 980 F.2d at 96.
81. Id. at 101. In Southview the court stated that in determining whether a
landowner's substantive due process rights were violated by arbitrary and
capricious governmental conduct, the first inquiry must be whether:
'an entitlement exists in what has been applied for... instead of
simply recognizing the owner's indisputable property interests in the
land he owns and asking whether ...government has exceeded the
limits of substantive due process in regulating the plaintiff's use of
his property by denying the application arbitrarily and capriciously.'
Id. at 101 (quoting RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton,
870 F.2d 911, 917 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 (1989)); see also
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 705 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he arbitrary and capricious standard itself
contemplates a searching 'inquiry into the facts' in order to determine 'whether
the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of judgment.'" (quoting Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971))); Corn v. City of
Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369 (11th Cir. 1993). In Corn the court stated
that "'the ultimate issue of whether a ...decision is arbitrary and capricious
is a question of law to be determined by the court. Although subsidiary facts
are properly for the factfinder, the ultimate issue is for the court.'" Id. at 1373
(quoting Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1578 (11th
Cir. 1989)); Pearson v. Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1217-19 (6th Cir. 1992)
("[T]he lack of uniformity among the circuits in dealing with the zoning cases
of the 'arbitrary and capricious substantive due process' category is
remarkable.").
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Another possible land use claim rests on an equal protection
irrationality, except that we know what a loose standard that is. I
will alert you to the fact that some decisions by land use bodies
are now being attacked as Bills of Attainder, 82 so that you can
even invoke a Bill of Attainder requirement if it is a legislative
decision which focuses in on a specific person. There was a very
83
interesting Second Circuit decision this year, In re McMullen,
in which, all of a sudden, Bills of Attainder have now been given
new light, not in the land use area, but in another area. So,
developers have discovered that there is a great big Constitution
out there and it has all kinds of provisions that have not been
applied. Instead of taking an appeal to the Zoning Board of
Appeals or an Article 78 proceeding, 84 they are going to go into
federal courts and throw around these constitutional provisions.
Thus, the Southview case is quite important because even
though the developer lost, Judge Oakes' decision lays out what
you have to do before you can come into federal court on one of

these claims, 85 and there are prerequisites. There is a ripeness
requirement, 86 in that whatever the adverse decision, it has to be
82. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. This section provides that "[n]o Bill of
Attainder... shall be passed." Id; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
44, § 11.9(c), at 420. A bill of attainder is a legislative act that imposes some
sort of punishment on an individual without first conducting a trial. Id.
83. 989 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 301 (1993).
84. N.Y. CIrv. PRAc. L. & R. § 7801 (McKinney 1981). See DAVID D.
SIEGEL, NEw YORK PRACTICE, § 557, at 580 (2d ed. 1991). An Article 78

proceeding provides a uniform device "for challenging the activities of an
administrative agency in court." It replaces the common law writs of
mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari to review. Id.
85. Southview Assocs., 980 F.2d at 92.
86. Id. at 95-97. The circuit court in Southview Assocs., referring back to
the district court's opinion, discussed the two-prong test used to assess the
ripeness of a takings claim as set forth in Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
The first prong requires that a "final decision" be rendered by the
governmental entity that is enforcing the regulation in question. Southview
Assocs., 980 F.2d at 95. The second prong requires that the plaintiff first seek
compensation from the state if the state provides an "'adequate provision for
obtaining compensation.'" Id. (quoting Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194).
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a final decision. 87 In addition, there cannot be a scheme for
compensation under state law. 88 To the extent that you can get
just compensation under state law, you have to pursue that
avenue first. It is only after your land is taken, a final decision is
rendered, and you cannot get compensation under state law, that
you can come into federal court on a taking claim. Both of those
prerequisites also apply to a substantive due process "gone too
far" claim, but they do not apply to a substantive due process
claim based on "arbitrary and capricious" conduct. While it
would take me two hours to explain the differences between
those, you really should be alert, as I say, that this river of
development in the land use area now gets deltas and tributaries
and all kinds of side requirements, and all I can do is alert you to
that case as an indication of how complicated this whole area
gets. Thank you very much.

87. Id. at 97. The court in Southview again relied on Williamson County
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172
(1985), in stating that a final decision is one that would "'conclusively
determine whether [the developer would] be denied all reasonable beneficial
use of its property.'" Southview Assocs., 980 F.2d at 97 (quoting Williamson,
473 U.S. at 194). It reasoned that "'the economic impact of the challenged
action and the extent to which it interferes with reasonable investment-backed
expectations ...cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has
arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations
at issue to the particular land in question.'" Id. (quoting Williamson, 473 U.S.
at 190-91). Thus, there would be no possibility that "'some development
w[ould] be permitted.'" Southview Assocs., 980 F.2d at 98 (quoting
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 352 (1986))
(emphasis added).
88. Id. at 99. Prior to asserting a regulatory taking claim, the land owner
must first seek compensation from the state if a "'reasonable, certain and
adequate provision for obtaining compensation'" exists. Id. (quoting
Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194). It is felt that there can be no violation of the
Just Compensation Clause, which does not disallow the taking of property, but
the taking of property without just compensation, until there has been an
unsuccessful attempt to obtain compensation through the state provided
procedures. Id.
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Professor Gary M. Shaw:
You are right. You went far afield on a number of different
areas and I have a number of different questions, but in the
interest of keeping things short and brief, I am only going to ask
one of them and that deals with Heller v. Doe by Doe.89 I was
struck as I read the case by just how deferential the Court was,
which was something you pointed out. There has been a lot of
talk in previous years about developing a more variable standard
in order to get away from this two-part test, which is actually a
three-part test if you are dealing with gender discrimination. The
idea was to develop something which would be somewhat more
variable, based on measuring governmental interests against the
individual's interest at stake. Do you think that Heller v. Doe by
Doe sounded like a wrongful death act?
ProfessorLeon Friedman:
I really think so. You can go through that case and see the
absolute deference that the Court established. That there does not
have to be any scientific basis for a legislative decision in this
area is astonishing. I must say, I argued a case in the Second
Circuit on Monday dealing with the State Legislature prohibiting
trawlers from using a net to catch a lobster. 90 You cannot use a
prone to catch a lobster, but you can use a trap, and I was
arguing to Judge Oakes, "It doesn't make any sense, Your
Honor." And he said, "We are not interested in that, absolutely,
we are simply not going to permit that kind of distinction to come
into federal court."
So, I really do think that the whole deferential standard, as I
say, has reached the bottom. I do not see how you can win a case
89. 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
90. See New York State Trawlers Ass'n v. Jorling, Nos. 569, 93-7571,
1994 WL 12677 (2d Cir. Jan. 18, 1994) (upholding as constitutional an
amendment to the Environmental Conservation Law which prohibited fishing
vessels equipped with trawling nets from taking lobsters from the Long Island
Sound).
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on irrationality grounds unless there is some implication of
discrimination. The Supreme Court did have a case several years
ago, Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,91 which they
decided on an irrationality ground, but that really had to do with
a very clear case of discrimination against a community based
mental hospital. 92 So you can see, even though the group to be
protected was not someone protected by the Equal Protection
Clause, there was discrimination against a weak group in our
society and they went off in that direction. Just reading those two
pages of deferential language in the Heller case makes it highly
unlikely that any state or local government is going to have to
worry about the Equal Protection Clause, as long as you are not
in the heightened scrutiny area.
Professor Gary M. Shaw:
I think that is true.

91. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
92. The Supreme Court struck down a Texas city's denial of a special use
permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. Id. at 435.
Refusing to treat mental retardation as a "quasi-suspect" classification, the
Court applied a rational basis standard of review and found that the refusal to
grant the permit was not rationally related to any legitimate state purpose. Id.
at 442, 448. Instead, the Court felt that the denial of the permit rested "on an
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded." Id. at 450.

